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Security without Secrecy?
Counter-terrorism, ASIO, and access to information
The Foreign Office declined to disclose the reasons for deciding
that specific files should be withheld, with the result that the
reason for the continuing secrecy is itself...a secret.1
Mark Rix
University of Wollongong

With more and more secrecy, there is greater security.
Misguided and naive. The idea that providing ASIO, Australia’s domestic intelligence (in
other words, spy) agency, with greater powers to prevent disclosure about it and its activities
makes Australia and Australians more secure from the threat of terrorism has been repeatedly
endorsed by successive governments since the attacks on the World Trade Centre and
Pentagon in 2001. They have been much more reluctant to explain how secrecy actually adds
to security. There can be little dispute with the assertion that some level of secrecy is required
by ASIO to enable it to deal effectively with the terrorist threat. It is far more difficult to
accept that complete secrecy, and no accountability, equates to water-tight security. Before
considering these issues in greater depth, a couple of brief case studies will set the scene for
the investigation to follow.
A couple of preliminary case studies
Intelligence agencies’, police forces’, public officials’, governments’ justification for keeping secret
the reasons for not disclosing what they regard as secrets captures the central conundrum of this
chapter. The reasoning is really quite simple: there can be no security without secrecy. Seldom is
evidence adduced to support this line of reasoning because, if the reasoning is accepted as justified, it
would breach and weaken security. A relevant case, now some years old, illustrates the point that is
being made here. The second, more recent case perhaps makes the same point even more
resoundingly.

Izhar Ul-Haque, then a Sydney medical student, was charged with training with the Pakistan-based
terrorist group Lashkar-e-Toiba in 2003 well before it had been classified as a terrorist organisation
by the United Nations. On November 5th 2007 in the NSW Supreme Court, Justice Michael Adams
found that all records of interview with Mr Ul-Haque tendered by the Australian Federal Police as
evidence were inadmissible forcing the NSW Director of Public Prosecutions to withdraw the case
just before a jury was empanelled.2 The AFP had also tried to elicit information from Mr Ul-Haque
about the terror suspect Faheem Lodhi by questioning him in a maximum security gaol for more than
two hours but without first cautioning him or informing his lawyer of the interrogation.3 Two AFP
officers had demanded that Mr Ul-Haque turn informant against Lodhi who was subsequently
convicted and gaoled for 20 years for conspiring to bomb the national electricity grid.4 When he

refused to do so, Mr Ul-Haque was threatened that there would be serious and adverse consequences
for him.

While Mr Ul-Haque had briefly trained with Lashkar-e-Toiba in early 2003, the law enforcement
authorities had admitted to him that they accepted his connection to the organisation had nothing to do
with Australia but instead was because of his opposition to the Indian presence in Kashmir. The AFP
records of interview were found to be inadmissible because of the improper and oppressive conduct of
the AFP (and ASIO) officers involved, and because of the inextricable links between AFP and ASIO
including the disclosure by the AFP to ASIO of what Mr Ul-Haque had said in interview. Justice
Adams also found that two ASIO officers (whose identities remain secret) had committed the criminal
offences of kidnapping and false imprisonment at common law and another offence under the Crimes
Act. He also found that the conduct of the ASIO officers amounted to a gross breach of the powers
they had been granted under the search warrant which had been issued to them.

Ian Carnell, then Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, found in his subsequent report of
ASIO’s actions in the case, contrary to Justice Adams’ conclusion, there were insufficient grounds for
referring the matter for prosecution. He also concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support
compensation to Mr Ul-Haque for false imprisonment.5

The recent Ben Zygier, or ‘Prisoner X, case in which ASIO was somehow involved is in its own way
even more perplexing than Izhar Ul-Haque’s. Trying to future out exactly what went on is like trying
to find your way in the dark in unfamiliar territory without a torch such is the secrecy surrounding the
case that is being maintained by both Israel and Australia. Mr Zygier, a dual Australian-Israeli citizen,
was found dead in December 2010 in his ‘suicide-proof’ prison cell in Israel’s maximum-security
Ayalon prison. He is believed to have hanged himself with a bed sheet. Evidently, he had been
detained by the Israelis for serious breaches of that country’s security laws. These breaches allegedly
involved passing information to ASIO about Mossad’s practice of using Australian passports to
enable its agents to spy in countries that are hostile to Israel. The Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin
Netanyahu has denied that Zygier passed on information to any Australian security agency,
specifically ASIO. Australian Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus backed up this claim. Much more
seriously for Zygier, he unintentionally sabotaged a highly sensitive and secretive Mossad operation
to repatriate the remains of Israeli soldiers killed in the 1982 war in Lebanon. For this he was
evidently charged with treason.6

Introduction
After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, Australia became a particularly
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active combatant in the ‘war on terror’ especially in the field of legislation with what
Professor George Williams referred to on the 10th anniversary of ‘9/11’ as an ‘extraordinary
burst of law-making’.7 Its legislative performance has eclipsed the relatively paltry efforts of
Great Britain, the United States and Canada not only in purely quantitative terms but also in
the extent to which these efforts have gone in inhibiting the liberties and rights of every
Australian. Misuse and abuse of information, inscrutable but far-reaching information
classification procedures and downright obfuscation all have become key weapons in the
counter-terrorism arsenal of democratically-elected governments like Australia’s. Indeed, it
seems at times to be a war on openness and accountability rather than terror such are the
curbs on transparency and public disclosure that have been introduced since 11 September
2011. Australia has led the field in this particular campaign.

This chapter is primarily concerned with investigating the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation’s role in the protection of Australia’s national security in what was at least until
2009 (when the phrase was abandoned by the Obama Administration, a decision renewed in
May 2013) known around the world officially and unofficially as the global ‘war on terror’.
In addressing this primary concern, the chapter will consider the powers that ASIO is granted
under the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Act 2003, in particular,
ASIO’s sweeping questioning and detention powers and the severe restrictions the Act
imposes on suspects, and non-suspects, regarding disclosure of information about their
questioning and detention by ASIO.8 The ASIO Act’s restrictions on disclosure of
information will be considered with reference to the strict, and complementary, controls on
disclosure of ‘information’ or ‘national security information’ in Commonwealth criminal and
civil trials that are imposed by the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil
Proceedings) Act 2004. The NSI Act, which as will be seen uses the ASIO Act’s definition of
what Australia’s ‘security’ comprises, puts considerable obstacles in the way of the chances
of a terrorism suspect receiving a fair trial. More importantly for this chapter, the NSI Act
erects around terrorism cases an almost impenetrable shield of secrecy and lack of
transparency, binds the processes for classifying and protecting information in obscure and
unfathomable red (more correctly, invisible) tape, and effectively protects the political
executive and national security agencies like ASIO from external, independent scrutiny.

In addition to these two acts, the chapter will briefly consider the Public Interest Disclosures
Bill that was introduced into the Federal Parliament by Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus in
3

March 2013. This Bill feigns, amongst other things, to make it easier to disclose and
investigate wrongdoing and maladministration in the Commonwealth public sector. More
simply, it will according to Mr Dreyfus and its other proponents in the government legalise
public interest whistleblowing. However, like the ASIO and NSI Acts, the Public Interest
Disclosures Bill reverts to the default option of a smug but defensive presumption in favour
of not disclosing much if any information about defence, security, counter-terrorism or
anything else that could conceivably be linked to Australia’s ‘national security’. As with the
ASIO and NSI Acts, the term ‘national security’ is circularly defined to include ‘national
security information’ (or, ‘intelligence information’) which is in turn defined to include
‘national security’.

Together, these three acts have the effect of creating a sort of three-sided hall of mirrors in
which each act’s restrictions on the disclosure, and availability, of information are tightened
as one act reinforces the other in providing fewer and narrower avenues for access to and
release of information in the conduct of terrorism investigations and any subsequent trials.
Indeed, it seems that the three acts are all indeed predicated on the assumption that there can
be no security without secrecy; in other words that, in effect, secrecy and security are to be
equated with each other and each reducible to the other. This is a very dangerous assumption
to proceed on not only in counter-terrorism cases or but also in criminal cases of other sorts if
democracy, human rights and the rule of law are to have real, practical meaning and effect in
this country but especially in the way this country’s criminal justice system operates.9
Whether or not the three acts, individually or in conjunction, actually protect and strengthen
Australia’s national security in the ‘war on terror’ is also impossible to determine because of
the unavailability of the type of information—that is, information which is comprehensive,
independent, and reliable—required by an average individual to enable them to make a wellinformed assessment of the acts’ effectiveness in this area. Because of this troubling dearth of
openness, transparency and accountability, it is simply not possible to reach the conclusion
that the established legislation, namely the ASIO and NSI Acts, must be effective because so
far as we know Australia has not yet been the victim of a major or even minor terrorist attack.

The absence of evidence in support of the assumption that there is no security without
secrecy admittedly does not constitute compelling grounds for rejecting it. More obviously,
of course, absence of evidence delivers no compelling grounds for accepting the assumption.
In light of this pervasive uncertainty, faith and trust in the integrity of Australia’s political
4

and criminal justice system, its traditions, history, the government, or even its politicians is a
possible recourse but if adopted any faith would be blind and the trust largely unfounded. In
other words, without accountability and transparency faith and trust are baseless except for
the similarly groundless faith and trust that they are in the circumstances the most appropriate
or realistic response. And, perhaps more to the point, without openness, transparency and
accountability there is can be real security.

In light of the foregoing, it appears that there are a number of alternative ways of framing the
chapter’s title. Clearly, the most obvious alternative is ‘Can there be security without
transparency and accountability?’ Nearly as obvious contenders are ‘Can there be security
with transparency and accountability?’ and, perhaps the most challenging of the possibilities
but too easily dismissed as oxymoronic, ‘Can there be security with secrecy but no
transparency and accountability?’ Challenging and an evident oxymoron it might be, but an
affirmative answer to the latter alternative has been and continues to be the default option for
Australian governments and the defence, intelligence, security and law enforcement
departments, agencies and public servants they claim to oversee. This perhaps obscure and
cryptic point will become clearer in the course of the investigation of the counter-terrorism
legislation that will be conducted below.

The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism)
Act 2003
The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act
2003 (Cth) (sometimes referred to as the ASIO Amendment Act 2003 but hereafter simply
and generally referred to as the ASIO Act) was introduced into the Commonwealth
Parliament during 2003 and enacted later that year. It does not help that the original ASIO
Act (1979, Cth) was amended twice during 2003, but every effort here will be made to keep
things as clear and straightforward as possible.10 One of the key amendments was the
introduction of Part III Division 3 Special powers relating to terrorism offences often referred
to as the ‘Special Powers Regime’) that ‘created a new system of warrants which, when
issued, empower [ASIO] to question and detain individuals for the purposes of gathering
intelligence about terrorism offences’.11 The system of warrants is also referred to as the
‘Special Powers Regime’. This regime is regarded as ‘one of the most controversial pieces of
legislation ever passed by the Commonwealth Parliament’ because of the ‘vesting of
“policing” powers of questioning and detention in a domestic intelligence agency.”12 Initially,
5

a sunset clause was to have seen ASIO’s special powers expire in 2006, but this was
subsequently extended out to 2016 (affirmed in the ASIO Legislation Amendment Bill 2006). The
amended ASIO Act 2003 extended the questioning period to 48 hours (from 24 hours) if an
interpreter is required to be present at any stage of the interrogation of a suspect (or, nonsuspect). A person requiring an interpreter cannot be questioned for more than a total of 24,
32 or 40 hours ‘unless the prescribed authority before whom the person was being questioned
just before the duration of that questioning reached that total permits the questioning to
continue’.13 However, under the Special Powers a person can be detained for up to 168 hours
(7 days) whether or not they need an interpreter.

It is important to be clear on the circumstances in which under the ASIO Act a person can be
taken into custody, detained and questioned. The relevant Minister (i.e., the Federal AttorneyGeneral) can consent to a request from the Director General of ASIO for a questioning and
detention warrant to be issued if he or she has reasonable grounds for believing that this will
‘substantially assist the collection of intelligence that is important in relation to a terrorism
offence’ and ‘that relying on other methods of collecting that intelligence would be
ineffective’14 Thus, a person can be detained without charge, and does not even have to be suspected
of having committed any offence (terrorism or other) to be taken into custody and questioned in
secret. While being interrogated, a person held in detention has to answer all questions and provide all
the information or the ‘record’ or ‘thing’ requested of them. A detainee also has to prove that they do
not have the information or record or thing requested. If the detainee is unable to do so and does not
provide the information, record or thing requested they can be imprisoned for up to five years. A
person can also be detained if there are reasonable grounds for believing that if they are not
immediately take into custody they could alert someone who is in the act of committing a terrorism
offence that the offence is being investigated, that they might not come before the prescribed authority
or that they could ‘destroy, damage or alter a record or thing the person may be requested in
accordance with the warrant to produce.’15

The secrecy provisions are lengthy and incredibly detailed but sections of them are worthy of
some attention. These provisions are found in the ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2003,
no. 143, Schedule 1, Part 4 Secrecy relating to warrants and questioning. Before the expiry of
a warrant, a person (known as the ‘discloser’) commits an offence if the ‘discloser discloses
(sic) information’ and the information is about the issuing of the warrant, the content of the
warrant or the questioning or detention of a person under the warrant and/or the information
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is ‘operational information’. Operational information is information that ASIO has or had, a
source of information that ASIO has or had (other than the person who is the subject of the
warrant), or an ASIO operational capability, method or plan. Even in the 2 years after the
expiry of a warrant, it is an offence for a discloser to disclose information when the
information is operational information and/or the information has almost anything else to do
with the warrant. In addition to these restrictions and prohibitions, what is known as ‘strict
liability’ applies if the information is operational information or is about the warrant or the
questioning and detention of the person who is the subject of the warrant. It also applies if the
discloser is the person whose is the subject of the warrant, or is a lawyer acting for that
person who was present during questioning or was otherwise involved in representing the
person and knew something about the warrant and how they were treated.16

The Special Powers Regime has a tightly limited provision for a person who is questioned
and/or detained under a warrant to contact a lawyer of his or her or own choice but the
prescribed authority can impose further strict controls on this contact. If, for the example, the
prescribed authority is satisfied that contact with the lawyer of the person’s choice may lead
to the destruction or damaging of a thing or record associated with the warrant he or she can
limit or even prevent contact with the lawyer. And, as the Law Council of Australia points
out, the Special Powers enable a person under a warrant to be questioned without a lawyer of
the person’s choice being present. The prescribed authority can also ask for the removal of
the lawyer during questioning if he or she believes the lawyer is being unduly disruptive. In
addition, ‘Section 34L of the ASIO Act compels a person named in a warrant to give
information and items [thing or record] to ASIO regardless of whether doing so might tend to
incriminate the person or make them liable to a penalty.’17

The National Security Information Act, which will be considered further below, also imposes
restrictions on a lawyer’s access to relevant information. These reinforce and complement the
restrictions contained in the ASIO Act. While there is not the scope here to consider the NSI
Act’s restrictions on a lawyer’s access to information in great detail, the restrictions imposed
by the Act on a defendant’s choice of a legal representative are nevertheless relevant and
worthy of some attention. These restrictions are contained in Section 39 of the NSI Act,
Security clearances required in federal criminal proceedings. This Section deals with a
situation in which a defendant’s legal representative, or person assisting the legal
representative, has been notified by the Secretary of the Attorney-General’s Department that
7

it is probable that in the proceeding a disclosure of information which is likely to prejudice
national security will be made.18 When thus notified a person ‘may apply’ for a security
clearance ‘at the level considered appropriate by the Secretary in relation to the information
[likely to be disclosed in the proceeding]’.19

The level of security clearance required by a legal representative is calibrated to match the
highest level of classification of the NSI information that is likely to be disclosed.
Classifications of NSI Information range from ‘restricted’, followed by ‘confidential’, then
up to ‘secret’ and finally ‘top secret’. So if ‘Secret’ is the highest NSI classification for the
information likely to be disclosed then a ‘Secret’ level security clearance is required by the
legal representative. The process of classifying information, and of determining the level of
its classification, is clouded in secrecy and is evidently a completely arbitrary one; no light at
all is thrown on the process by the Act itself including its accompanying Requirements and
Regulations or by the Practitioner’s Guide. Secrecy and arbitrariness accordingly also
surround the process of setting the level of and issuing a security clearance. Nevertheless, as
the NSI Act Practitioner’s Guide reassuringly points out, ‘The security clearance process is
conducted at arm’s length from the agencies involved in prosecutions.’20

But what, after all, is ‘information’, what is ‘national security information’, what are
‘security’ and ‘national security’ and what is national security information, specifically, that
which is ‘likely to prejudice national security’. The section below, which considers the NSI
Act and its relationship with the ASIO Act, attempts to cast some light on these unnecessarily
obscure terms and the phenomena they denote. This is not as easy as it would first seem
because attempting to cast light involves entering another hall of mirrors.

The National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004
The NSI Act and the ASIO Act together set the conditions under which information in counterterrorism cases can be accessed and used by lawyers, journalists, members of the public or any
other interested parties. The object of the NSI Act is to prevent the disclosure in Federal criminal
or civil proceedings of information that is likely to prejudice national security ‘except to the
extent that preventing disclosure would seriously interfere with the administration of justice.’21 In
defining ‘information’ the NSI Act defers to the Commonwealth Criminal Code. In the Code
(subsection 90.1(1)) information is defined as meaning ‘information of any kind, whether true or
false and whether in material form or not, and includes a) an opinion, and b) a report of a
8

conversation.’22 The NSI Act supplements this already far-reaching and all-encompassing
definition with the phrase ‘whether or not in the public domain’. Thus, in the end, information
can be very nearly anything and the term is accordingly vacuous and meaningless. But, the point
is of course that the breadth, meaninglessness and vacuousness of the term provide the
government, and ASIO, with an almost impenetrable and unfathomable legislative screen for
hiding information and tightly controlling its use and disclosure even in circumstances where this
is prejudicial to a terrorism suspect’s chance of receiving a fair trial. Indeed, non-disclosure of
any information by anyone seems very much to be the preferred option. Not only does this
prejudice the chance of a fair trial for a suspect, it is also completely prejudicial to democratic
accountability and transparency. The definition of ‘national security information’ provided by the
Act, which is considered below, does not improve the situation. Before looking at this definition,
however, the meaning of ‘national security’ and the other terms contained in it first have to be
considered.

As the Act’s Practitioner’s Guide redundantly points out, ‘The meaning of “national security” is
central to the operation of the NSI Act, Regulations and Requirements.’23 In the Act (Section 8)
‘national security means Australia’s defence, security, international relations or law enforcement
interests.’ The meanings of these other terms, which are defined in turn, make national security
even broader and more inclusive than it already is. ‘Law enforcement interests’ are defined to
include foreign and security intelligence, and the technologies and methods used in its collection,
analysis and security, within its ambit. These interests have been included in the definition of ‘to
ensure that law enforcement information which is connected to national security...is not excluded
from protection under the NSI Act.’24 The Act adopts the same definition of ‘security’ as that
contained in Section 4 of the ASIO Act 1979 where security means the protection of Australia
and Australians from espionage, sabotage, politically motivated violence and the promotion of
communal violence, attacks on the country’s ‘defence system’ and foreign interference whether
these are ‘directed from, or committed within, Australia or not’. To this sweeping definition is
added ‘the carrying out of Australia’s responsibilities to any foreign country’ in relation to any of
these matters.25

Not surprisingly, in addition to defining ‘national security’ (and the various terms other than
defence embedded in it) and ‘information’, the NSI Act defines ‘national security information’ to
be a sort of supplement to the definitions of these other two terms ensuring that each is
inseparably tied to the other.26 Building on the object of the Act, ‘national security information’ is
information that either ‘relates to national security’ or ‘the disclosure of which may affect
9

national security.’ ‘Relates to’ and ‘may affect’ are not further defined or explained. Nevertheless
given the broad meaning of national security and information, almost any conceivable
information (even that which is inconceivable or non-information) either actually or potentially
relates to or affects national security. However, the pièce de résistance in the NSI Act

lexicography is ‘prejudicial to national security’ the definition of which is so utterly circular as
to mean almost nothing (and, therefore nearly everything). The meaning of this term is provided
in Section 17, where it is defined thus: ‘1) A disclosure of information is likely to prejudice
national security if there is a real, and not merely a remote, possibility that the disclosure will
prejudice national security.’27

Despite the evident meaninglessness, vacuousness and circularity of these terms they can have
very important and very serious effects for a defendant when invoked in terrorism trials. Section
24 of the NSI Act requires the Attorney-General to be notified if the information or its disclosure
relates to or may affect national security. Where the Attorney-General determines that disclosure
of the information would prejudice national security, he or she issues a non-disclosure certificate
to the court (Section 26). It is not clear how such a determination is arrived at by the AttorneyGeneral. In any event, there are different sorts of certificates that can be issued by the AttorneyGeneral if he or she has decided that information prejudicial to national security is likely to be
disclosed in criminal (or, civil) proceedings. A criminal non-disclosure certificate is issued when
the Attorney-General has been notified under Section 24 or subsection 25(6) that information
relating to or which could affect national security will be disclosed by a party to the proceeding or
a witness and he or she believes that the information is likely to prejudice national security. The
Attorney-General issues a criminal witness exclusion certificate when he or she has been notified
under Section 24 or 25(6), or expects ‘that a person whom the prosecutor or defendant intends to
call as a witness may disclose information by his or her presence’ and believes that this
information is likely to be prejudicial to national security.28 Naturally, a defendant can appeal
against the issuing of a criminal non-disclosure or witness exclusion certificate. However, ‘the
court is required to give greatest weight to the question of “the risk of prejudice to national
security” rather to the needs and rights of the accused’.29 This is consistent with other aspects of
the NSI Act and, as seen above, of the ASIO Act. Worryingly, the new Public Interest Disclosure
Bill also shares some of the same aspects.

Public Interest Disclosure Bill
As was noted at the beginning of this chapter, in March 2013 Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus
announced that the Public Interest Disclosure Bill, under which public sector whistleblowers will
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have more protection, had been introduced to Parliament. According to Mr Dreyfus, the Bill
‘reaffirms the Government’s commitment to a culture of disclosure in the Australian public
sector.’ It includes a framework for the investigation of public interest disclosures, whistleblower
protections and sets out circumstances in which disclosures can be made outside government. The
Attorney-General also pointed out that ‘Open and transparent government is a key feature of a
strong democracy and this bill, along with our reforms to FOI laws, will help build and maintain
that culture’.30

The Objects of the Bill are all highly laudable: promoting the integrity and accountability of
the Commonwealth public sector; encouraging and facilitating the making of public interest
disclosures by public officials; ensuring that public officials who make such disclosures are
supported and protected from adverse consequences that may arise from disclosures; and,
ensuring that disclosures are properly investigated and dealt with.31 However, these objects
have pretty strict limits which are to be found scattered at various points through the act. For
example, it is noted in Division2, Section 26 in which, amongst other things, public interest
disclosures are defined (this definition runs for several pages) that the limitations which
should be taken into account in making disclosures are designated publication restrictions and
the need to protect intelligence information. Among the several meanings of designated
publication restriction is an order under sections 31 or 38L of the NSI Act dealing
respectively with non-disclosure certificate and witness exclusion certificate hearings in
federal criminal proceedings and civil non-disclosure certificate and civil witness exclusion
certificate hearings in civil proceedings. Included in intelligence information is information
identifying ‘a person as being, or having been, an agent or member of the staff (however
described) of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service or the Australian Security
Intelligence Organisation.’32 Intelligence information also includes sensitive law enforcement
information which is identical in meaning to the meaning of law enforcement interests
included in the NSI Act’s definition of national security. Sensitive law enforcement
information and law enforcement interests both comprise, amongst other things, foreign and
security intelligence, and the technologies and methods used in its collection. Division 29,
Section 29 of the Public Interest Disclosure Bill defines and gives examples of different kinds
of disclosable conduct (this also runs for several pages). Section 33 deals with Conduct
connected with intelligence agencies. There it is stipulated that ‘conduct is not disclosable
conduct if it is: a) conduct that an intelligence agency engages in the proper performance of
its functions or the proper exercise of its powers; or b) conduct that a public official who
11

belongs to an intelligence agency engages in for the purposes of the proper performance of its
functions or the proper exercise of its powers.’33 The Public Interest Disclosures Bill does not
deal in detail with information or how it is to be protected, because these, as seen above, are
already fully covered in the NSI Act, and in the ASIO Act.

The Public Interest Disclosure Bill passed largely unannounced and unnoticed into law in
June 2013. It is a potentially important piece of legislation that seeks to protect from
dismissal, retaliation or adverse cost decisions Commonwealth public sector whistleblowers
who disclose corruption, fraud and misconduct, and other forms of serious wrongdoing.
Unfortunately however, and as noted above, whistleblowing about federal politicians and
intelligence agencies is not included in the Act. In other words, Australian incarnations of the
likes of Edward Snowden and Bradley Manning would receive no protection under the Act.34
Conclusion
The secrecy surrounding information, national security information, security, national
security, international relations, and law enforcement interests is baffling, all-pervasive and
largely impenetrable. Successive Australian governments have successively added to this
secrecy and impenetrability. It is far less clear whether this has helped to make Australians
more secure from the threat of terrorism. It is clear, however, that it has left them more
vulnerable to the secret, clandestine and sometimes illegal activities of ASIO which,
surrounded in secrecy founded on sloppy, all-encompassing and unfathomable legislation, is
subject to few if any requirements for openness, transparency and accountability. In the end,
this can only lead to one conclusion: there really is no security in secrecy.
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